Fuckwits
A functional definition, not a slur
A Fuckwit is a bad person—but not in the way people usually mean.
A Fuckwit is not defined by intelligence, temperament, or intent. A Fuckwit is someone who consistently erodes agency—their own or others'—while advancing their position inside a system. What makes this definition uncomfortable is that Fuckwits are often locally rational and institutionally rewarded.
As organisations scale, they naturally attract more Fuckwits. This is not a moral failing; it is a selection effect. Large systems create abstraction, insulation, and asymmetry. These conditions favour actors who externalise risk, defer responsibility, and exploit process rather than outcome. Over time, such behaviour outcompetes competence.
Importantly, Fuckwits are not limited to employees. They appear everywhere a system interfaces with the world:
- customers who exploit policy
- suppliers who arbitrage ambiguity
- channel partners who free-ride
- regulators who optimise for optics
- external publics who reward signalling over substance
The common organisational response is predictable: deploy Fuckwittery internally. More rules. More approvals. More controls. More compliance. These mechanisms are intended to constrain Fuckwits.
This response is a systemic error.
Fuckwittery does not suppress Fuckwits; it amplifies them. Rule-dense environments advantage those most willing to game, hide behind, or weaponise process. Competent operators slow down or disengage. Over time, the organisation becomes safer—and stupider.
The key mistake is treating Fuckwits as a risk to be constrained rather than a strategy to be made unviable.
Paragentism takes the opposite approach: design systems where Fuckwittery does not pay. When incentives align agency with outcome, Fuckwits lose leverage. They are not expelled; they become irrelevant. Their behaviour stops working.
This is not about moral purification. It is about changing the selection pressure.